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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
good faith purchaser from the reacquirer. Both the West Boston
Bank and Pistorino cases were cited with approval. However,
upon appeal, 5 the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment be-
cause it appeared on the face of the note that it was not nego-
tiable; however, the court expressly declined to pass on the
rights of the parties in the event the note was negotiable.
Although the factual situation presented in these cases ap-
parently seldom arises, it is submitted that an amendment to
to Negotiable Instruments Law is necessary. In none of the
above cases did the court attempt to interpret the existing sec-
tions of the Negotiable Instruments Law; and, although Sec.
1961e of the Negotiable Instruments Law authorizes the appli-
cation of the rules of the law merchant to situations which are
not covered by the Negotiable Instruments Law, certainly a
specific amendment to correct an obvious omission is prefer-
able to possible divergent interpretations and constructions of
existing sections of the Negotiable Instruments Law or resort
to the law merchant.
ROBERT G. MCCLINTOCK*
DEFAMATION BY WILL
Should a man's wrong, because its effect and operation is
postponed until after his death, be declared no wrong at all?
This is probably an over-simplication of the problem, but in
principle this question answered affirmatively may be the state
of the law with regard to a libel contained in a will. An action
by the defamed person has in some cases been dismissed on a
general demurrer, or a motion to dismiss, for failure to state a
cause of action.1
15. 261 N. Y. 212, 185 N. E. 77 (1933).
16. Section 196 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
In any case not governed by this act the rules of the law merchant
shall govern.
* Member of the Missouri Bar; former member of the staff, WAsH.
U. L.Q.
1. In these cases, the person libelled generally sues the executor in each
of the latter's two capacities: (1) as a party who helped commit the
publication of the libel, and (2) as the decedents' personal representative.
The defendant in his former capacity is invariably dismissed from the
action since the acts of publication that he commits are done under com-
pulsion of law under his statutory duty to probate the will. The executor
as representative of the estate is the capacity with which we are in the
main concerned in the present article.
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The situation as aforementioned has come up for decision in
only five states.2 Although three of the cases allowed recovery, 3
the reasoning used in two of them nullifies their persuasive
authority. That leaves us with a dearth of authority, since in
the other forty-three states, there is no case law.4
In two of the cases in which recovery was allowed,5 the im-
portant problem of publication was handled in a most unsatis-
factory manner. The courts concluded that the executor of the
estate is, for the purpose of publication, the agent of the de-
ceased. This is, however, clearly contrary to the established
principles of agency.6 To hold as these courts have done is to
disregard entirely the principle of stare decisis. 7  The most
recent case which embraces the fact situation described in this
note clearly recognizes that the executor could not be an agent
of the deceased as to publication of the libel since the agency is
not coupled with an interest.,
The law of principal and agent, therefore, cannot be used as
a basis for granting recovery in this situation; however, there
is another, and more realistic argument in favor of allowing
the defamed person to recover. Professor Harperg states that
when the testator's intent is clear and malicious and the publi-
2. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128-Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914).
Noted in 12 MicH. L. REv. 489 (1913); 23 YALE L. J. 534 (1913); 62 U.
of PA. L. REv. 643 (1913). Citizens and Southern National Bank v.
Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313 (1933) noted in 10 N. C. L. REv.
88 (1931). Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct.
1945). Carver v. Morrow, 213 S. C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948); noted in
97 U. of PA. L. REV. 289 (1949), 62 HARv. L. REv. 318 (1949); 28 NEB.
L. Rnv. 128 (1949); 33 MINN. L. RB-. 171 (1949); 10 U. oF PIT. L. REV.
248 (1949); Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901).
3. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., supra note 2; Brown v. Mack, supra
note 2; Gallagher's Estate, supra note 2.
4. There are some state statutes that would affect any case such as we
pose here, even though no such case has arisen in that state. These statutes
will be discussed at length later in this article.
5. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914);
Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901).
6. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Wilson, 139 N.Y. 284, 34 N.E. 784
(1893); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 120 (1933).
7. However, the restators themselves provided for some exception. RE-
STATEMENT, AGENCY § 120 comment a, caveat; accord, Glennan v. Rochester
Trust and Safe Deposit Co., 209 N.Y. 12, 102 N.E. 537 (1913). The court
in Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914) held
that the executor was the agent of the deceased until the duty under the
will was discharged; it is this reasoning that makes the case such poor
authority for the proposition for which it stands.
8. Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948).
9. Professor Fowler Vincent Harper, at present a professor of law at
Yale Law School.
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cation is inevitable, then the publication should be charged back
or related to the person setting the force of evil into motion, i. e.,
to the deceased.y' Further, there is some good case authority to
the effect that when a person writes libelous material and puts it
into motion in such a way that he must certainly know that
third parties will receive intelligence of the libel, he has at the
time the material left his hands committed the publication of
the libel.11' If, as these cases indicate, the sender of a libelous
letter which he mailed to the libeled party is liable to such person
when he should have known that third persons would read the
libelous material, then a testator who has every intention to
have his will probated and who must know that it will be spread
for all time upon the public record for all to see, should be held
to have committed the publication when he puts the will in the
hands of his attorney or into the hands of any third party for
safeguarding.
When one follows Professor Harper's doctrine of relation
back 2 one becomes enmeshed in the problem of abatement and
survival of causes of action. At common law it was pretty well
established that actio personalis moritur cum persona, that is
personal actions die with the person.'3 This held true whether
10. HAmRER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 236 (1933); Bowim,
CODs OF ACTIONABLE DEPAMATION 5 (1923) Scott v. Shepard, 3 Wils. 403
95 Eng. Rep. 1124 (1773), which stated that where an injury is caused
by a force set in motion and its result is inevitable it is a direct injury
sufficient to be a trespass to the person. This last historical reference is
analogous to the principal fact situation in that the common law's strict
requirements for trespass were broken down where the results were in-
evitable and the requirement for publication presently is hardly as well
intrenched or crystallized a rule as to be susceptible to the same exception
today.
11. Lane v. Schilling, 130 Ore. 119, 279 Pac. 267 (1929), where the
defendant wrote the plaintiff, knowing that the plaintiff was blind and
that others would read the letter to him; the court held that the sending
of the letter was the publication; Riley v. Askin & Marine Co., 134 S.C.
198, 132 S.E. 584 (1926), where a department store wrote a letter to a
young lady accusing her of attempting to avoid paying a bill owed to them.
The court held that if the defendant had reason to believe others besides
the girl would read the letter, the sending was publication. Note that this
decision was reached in the same jurisdiction in which Carver v. Morrow,
213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948) was decided. Cf. Blakely v. Estate of
Shortal, 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945).
12. HARPER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 236 (1933).
13. Although the axiom at common law was well established, a research
has indicated to this writer that its evolution was the result of an errone-
ous application of an entirely different rule. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH LAW 576 (3rd ed. 1923) where he indicates that the original
maxim was "action for penalties die with the person." He deduces this
from his reading of three early cases in 1410, 1440, and 1521. These cases
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the dying party were the tortfeasor or the victim. This being
true, the court in any case in which a publication can be spelled
out so as to result in a libel is nevertheless bound to find that the
tortfeasor's death destroyed any cause of action which might
have arisen.
To effectuate Professor Harper's theory, therefore, there
would have to be a statutory change providing for the survival
of causes of action in libel cases. Professor Harper's reasoning
might be applied even in the absence of such a statute if the
court indulges in a fiction of dual time of publication, which
will be discussed at length later.
A search of state statutes has indicated some considerable
abrogation of this dogmatic axiom.1 4 In sixteen states 5 the
axiom per se has been expressly abolished but actions arising in
in defamation have, for some obscure reason, been reserved as
actions which still follow the common law axiom and abate or
die with the person of either the tortfeasor or victim. Two
other states have codified the common law rule of the non-
survival of actions but have listed certain exceptions; thus all
personal actions not expressly excepted therein still abate and
die with the death of either party.16
used the phrase as quoted in the note where the action was trespass
quare clausum fregit. The liability in trespass to land was pretty nearly
absolute at common law and thereby almost penal in nature whereas an
action of slander or libel was in the nature of case for words, the gist
of which was damages suffered by the plaintiff. The conclusion that Holds-
worth reaches is that the axiom was misinterpreted at later common law
as including all actions for damages as well as those penal in nature.
In addition, the cases which originally applied the maxim were cases
in which the deceased party was not the defendant but the person who
would be the plaintiff. Following this pattern it is easy to discern some
logic even in the later common law maxim. A personal injury is one which
injures one person and no one else. For his suffering he was the party to
be recompensed and thus if he died, the suffering, which was the element
essential to the action, ceased. But the situation posed in this note indi-
cates no such circumstance; here the dying party was the person causing
the injury and the suffering continued despite his death.
14. The reference is to actio personalis inoritur cum persona.
15. Mo. REv. STAT. § 98, 99 (1939); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 771
(Purdon, 1939); ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 150 (1940); ARK. STAT. tit. 27 § 902
(1947); COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 176, § 33 (1935); DEL. REV. CODE § 4637
(1935); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-3203 (1935); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.140
(1948); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 29 (1939); MINN. STAT. § 9656 (Mason,
1927); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1401 (1943); N.C.'GEN. STAT. § 28-175(1)
(1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12-1052 (1941); ORE. STAT. ANN. § 5-701 (1930);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8694 (Williams, 1934); Wis. STAT. § 287.01 and 331.01
(1947).
16. WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 3-402 (1945) as interpreted in Tuttle v.
Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 288 Pac. 524 (198b); W.VA. CODE § 5687 (1943) as
interpreted in Woodford v. McDaniels, 73 W.Va. 736, 81 S.E. 544 (1914).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/14
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In a recent South Carolina case on libel in a will,17 the court
decided that there was no publication and thus no libel. In the
dictum of this case the court went on to discuss the survival
statute of South Carolina. This statute is typical of a number
of states and hence will be set out herein:
Causes of action for and in respect to ... any and all in-
juries to the person ... shall survive both to and against
the personal representatives of the deceased person.-
In four states this type of statute has been interpreted as ex-
cluding actions for defamation.a There have been a variety of
reasons proferred by the courts for such exclusion. For example,
the South Carolina court said that injuries to reputation are
not injuries to the person.2 0 On the other hand the Washington
Supreme Court nullified the effect of its statute,21 interpreting
it to mean that if an action survived at common law, it still
survived under the statute-nothing more, nothing less.22 Ten
other states have a statute similar in form to the South Carolina
statute quoted supra. These states have interpreted their stat-
utes quite differently from the interpretations found in the other
four states. All of these states have allowed the survival of
libel actions and most have allowed the survival of any action
which sounds in defamation.23 In one of these states (New
York) a case was decided in which the exact problem under con-
sideration in this note was presented; in its decision the court
interpreted a statute virtually identical to the South Carolina
17. Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948).
18. S.C. CODE § 419 (1942).
19. S.C. CODE § 419 (1942); MASS. LAWS ANN. c. 228, § 1 (1933); R.I.
GEN. LAWS c. 512-1 (1938); WASH. REV. STAT. § 967 (Rem., 1932).
20. Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948).
21. WASH. REV. STAT. § 967 (Rem., 1932).
22. Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378, 232 Pac. 346
(1925).
23. N.Y., Decedent Estate Laws § 118 (1938); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6030
(1930); FLA. STAT. § 45.11 (1941) provides for non-survival of actions of
slander, but the court in State ex rel. Wolfe Construction Co. v. Parks, 129
Fla. 50, 175 So. 786 (1937) held that the statute by enumerating those
which do not survive meant that all others would, and that since libel is
not specifically mentioned it should survive. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-319 pro-
vides for non-abatement but the supreme court in Doolittle v. Eckert, 53
Idaho 384, 396, 24 P.2d 36, 39 (1933) held that this applied also to the
survival of actions. IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-403 (as amended in 1937) (Burns,
1933); IOWA CODE § 611.20 (1946); ME. REv. STAT. c. 152, § 8 (1944); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 609 (1942) ; N. H. REV. STAT. c. 355:9, 355:15 (1942); OHIO
CODE ANN. § 11235 (Throckmorton, 1940) ; see Estrick, Survival of Causes
of Action of Libel, Slander, Malicious Prosecution and Nuisance Under the
Ohio Law, 6 U. or CiN. L. RnV. 404 (1932).
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statute24 in an opposite manner and allowed recovery25 In only
two states are there statutes which specifically cover the situa-
tion under discussion here. In these states, the rule of non-
survival does not apply where the injured party still lives and
the guilty party is the one who has died.26 One statute is couched
in just those words,2 while the other statute excepts all cases
of slander and libel from the operation of the survival rule no
matter which party has died.28
There has been suggested in a Tennessee case29 a solution
which would bypass all the problems that have previously been
discussed. The court in that case reasons that since the death
brought about the libel, it could not at the same time be the
operative fact precluding the bringing of an action upon the
libel. The inconsistency and injustice of a contrary holding has
been recognized by case as well as secondary authority.30 Yet
the most recent article to discuss this problems' decries the
reasoning of the aforementioned Tennessee case8 2 as a mere in-
dulgence in dialectics.
Thus, in the present state of the law there are found virtually
insurmountable obstacles in the path of granting such relief
under the reasoning set forth above: (1) There must be a
publication of the libel which is chargeable to the party who is
to be sued, i. e., to the estate of the deceased. (2) Principal-
agent law cannot be employed to effect such a finding since the
estate does not publish the will, but it is rather done by the
24. S.C. CODE § 419 (1942).
25. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1932)
where the defendant was sued both as an individual and as executor; the
demurrer to the complaint as failing to state a cause of action against
him individually was sustained but the demurrer for failing to state a
cause of action against him as executor was overruled. In this case the
court followed Professor Harper's reasoning and then considered N.Y.
Decedent Estate Law § 118 (1938), which was identical with the S.C.
CODE § 419 (1942). The court held that personal injury meant any legiti-
mate, valid action that could be brought by the person, which if not
specifically prohibited or abolished by law survived. Actions for libel were
then held not withon the purview of the statute.
26. Cf. the historical discussion in Note 13, supra.
27. NEw M. STAT. § 19-701 (1941): "A cause of action for personal
injury survives the death of the party responsible therefor." This is such
a recent statute that no case could be found interpreting it.
28. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. § 5525 (1948).
29. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914).
30. Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. 733 (1901); Harris v. Nashville
Trust Co., supra note 29.
31. Note, 97 U. of PA. L. REV. 289, 290 (1948).
32. Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914).
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executor. (3) The executor is an agent of the court and not of
the deceased nor of the estate.3 3 (4) If one follows Professor
Harper's doctrine of the relation back of the libel,3 4 one is con-
fronted with the survival statutes previously discussed.
One possible solution is to call the estate an after-death mani-
festation of the testator, and to hold that the will, being of
value to the estate, should also be charged as a detriment against
the estate when necessary. Thus when the will is used by the
executor to benefit the estate in the administration of estate
affairs, and such use results in the commission of a libel, any
injury caused by the commission of such libel should be com-
pensated for by the estate, to whose benefit it is that the will
be probated.
This is at best countering a very bad fiction with a new one.
Again, this should be regarded as a mere temporary expedient
until the obstacles to the more realistic lines of reasoning men-
tioned previously can be obviated by the legislatures or by the
courts.
A solution that has been suggested to eliminate the entire
problem of libelous wills is that the defamatory parts of a will
be removed before probate, or that a will which contains de-
famatory matter be denied probate.35 Neither of these sug-
gested solutions is, it would seem, an ideal answer to the prob-
lem. As to the latter suggestion (refusing probate to a will
which contains libelous matter), the effect of a refusal to probate
would be to defeat the rights of innocent third parties who would
have been the recipients of the testator's bounty had the will
been given effect; clearly this is an undesirable result. As to
the former suggestion (the elimination of libelous matter from
the will prior to probate), the mere reading of the will to deter-
mine what is libelous is itself a form of publication and the real
harm will have been done, especially is a court battle ensues as
to what should or should not be eliminated.
33. Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
Carver v. Marrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948).
34. Professor Fowler Vincent Harper, at present a professor of law at
Yale Law School.
35. In re Draske's Will, 160 Misc. 587, 290 N.Y.S. 581 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
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CONCLUSIONS
That there should be recovery in this type of case seems
clearly a desirable result. Injuries such as may be sustained
from the publication of a libel by will or otherwise should not
be allowed to go unredressed upon such an excuse as the death
of the wrongdoer. The principal problem in granting relief in
this situation is to find a legal ground upon which to rest the
decision while doing minimum violence to well established
doctrine. The problem is extremely difficult of solution on
common law grounds. Obvious fictions would have to be used to
circumvent entirely the publication and survival problem. The
doctrine of inevitable cause and relation back seems to be the
most rational approach, but legislation is needed to clear away
the obstacle of non-survival. Specifically it seems necessary that
statutes be enacted to enable a libel action to survive the death
of the tort-feasor.
SIDNEY RUBIN*
Member of the Missouri bar; former member of the staff of the WASH.
U. L. Q.
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